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Gwenaël Njoto-Feillard
Financing Muhammadiyah: e Early 
Economic Endeavours of a Muslim Modernist 
Mass Organization in Indonesia (1920s-1960s)
Abstract: roughout its history, Indonesia’s largest Islamic reformist 
organization, the Muhammadiyah, has relied on funding based on the 
gift economy. Using the organization’s archived ínancial reports from the 
1920s to the 1960s–a source that had yet to be exploited–this study  shows 
how the Muhammadiyah used  different shares of resources (donations, 
member fees, subsidies, etc.) to ínance its organization. In the pre-War 
period, the Muhammadiyah Central Board became noticeably reliant on 
colonial subsidies. e reformist organization attempted to emancipate 
itself from this dependency and develop its own productive sector (businesses, 
cooperatives, banking, etc.), which  raised various ethical questions  as this 
socio-religious institution decides to operate lucrative  economic endeavours. 
Finally, this article argues that the case of Muhammadiyah clearly shows 
how Indonesian Islam was, quite early on, well-informed of the ethical 
debates surrounding the idea of ‘Islamic economics’ long before its recent 
emergence as an economic initiative in the Muslim communities.
Keywords: Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, Islam, gift economy, 
Reformism, enterprise, zakat.
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Abstrak: Sepanjang sejarahnya, Muhammadiyah, organisasi Islam reformis 
terbesar Indonesia, bergantung pada pendanaan yang berasal dari bantuan. 
Dengan menggunakan arsip laporan keuangan organisasi dari 1920 
sampai 1960 -sumber yang masih harus digali- artikel ini menggambarkan 
secara rinci perbedaan bagian sumber-sumber pendanaan (sedekah, iuran 
anggota, subsidi, dll.). Ia menunjukkan bahwa pada masa pra-peperangan, 
Muhammadiyah telah berusaha memberdayakan sendiri dari ketergantungan 
ini dan mengembangkan sektor-sektor produktif milik sendiri (usaha, koperasi, 
perbankan, dll.) yang juga dijelaskan artikel ini dengan rinci. Tulisan ini juga 
menunjukkan aneka kesulitan etis yang muncul saat lembaga kemasyarakatan-
keagamaan ini memutuskan untuk mengarahkan tujuannya kepada usaha-
usaha yang menguntungkan. Terlebih, kasus Muhammadiyah memperlihatkan 
secara jelas bahwa Islam Indonesia, sejak awal, telah memperoleh informasi 
dengan baik mengenai perdebatan etika seputar gagasan “Ekonomi Islam”.  
Kata kunci: Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, Islam, bantuan ekonomi, 
reformisme, perusahaan, zakat.
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Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s largest Muslim modernist organization, originated from the milieu of batik merchants and religious offi  cials in Yogyakarta (Central-Java). 
In the decades following its creation by K.H.1 Ahmad Dahlan (1868-
1923),2 the organization showed an impressive growth—both in terms 
of membership and in infrastructure—as it came to include thousands 
of branches, numerous hospitals, universities, schools and orphanages. 
For its expansion, the Muhammadiyah relied on a variety of modes of 
ë nancing—from membership fees, standard donations, religious alms 
and endowments to governmental subsidies—but also revenues from 
cooperatives and businesses.  is organizational capacity has often been 
the subject of great pride for Muslim modernists, as it was considered 
to be the most evident sign of the ‘spirit’ of Islamic reform that would 
overcome a local traditionalist mentality deemed to be limited to the 
various legalistic aspects of religious practice (í qh). Early on, reformist 
Islam’s merchant origins, its organizational capacity and modernist 
orientation were regarded as akin to the entrepreneurial spirit of ascetic 
Protestants described by Max Weber.3
But how successful was the Muhammadiyah in mobilizing 
these diff erent type of revenues from the gift economy? Did the 
organization manage to build durable businesses in parallel to its 
charitable activities? As a religious organization, did it face ethical 
quandaries in its economic orientations? As French historian Marcel 
Bonneff  remarks, “Muhammadiyah’s history, from the origins in the 
Kauman4 to the present day, with its two to three million members and 
sympathizers, is, itself also, an economic history, a history that emerges 
only faintly”.5 Indeed, to this date the only study that has approached, 
albeit brieì y, the subject is Alë an’s monograph published in 1989 on 
the ‘political behaviour’ of Muhammadiyah during colonial times.6 
 is paper proposes, therefore, to shed light on this ‘material history’ of 
Muhammadiyah from the 1920s to the 1960s.
 e period chosen for this study is considered essential for a number 
of reasons. First, although the Muhammadiyah was created in the early 
1910s, it was only in the 1920s that K.H. Ahmad Dahlan’s organization 
really started to expand throughout Java and in the outer-islands. In the 
1930s, as the eff ects of the 1929 Great Depression came to be felt in 
the Dutch Indies, a renewed awareness of the importance of economic 
matters appeared within Muhammadiyah ranks. After the 1940s—and 
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the inevitable economic downturn caused by almost a decade of the 
war—new opportunities seemed to appear for indigenous enterprise as 
the country was experiencing a form of liberal multi-party democracy 
in the 1950s. In the 1960s, however, the economy suff ered from 
political mismanagement, and this may have been one of the reasons 
why Muhammadiyah’s economic initiatives waned signië cantly. It was 
only at the end of the 1990s, and through the 2000s, that the reformist 
organization would again develop businesses on a large-scale.  at 
period will be the subject of a subsequent article.
For the period from the 1920s to the 1960s, the archives of the 
organization contain a signië cant set of data that is yet to be exploited. 
 is will be done through the study of the reports of its general assemblies 
(muktamar), as well as its offi  cial magazine, Suara Muhammadiyah and 
the Batavia branch’s journal, Pantjaran ‘Amal.  is branch was in charge 
of Muhammadiyah’s economic aff airs. 
Such a study does not have the ambition of surveying exhaustively 
the economic practices of the thousands of branches that constitute 
the organization. Rather, it focuses on the economic initiatives of 
the Muhammadiyah leadership, or Central Board (Pimpinan Pusat), 
in Yogyakarta and Jakarta within two main ë elds: the ‘gift economy’ 
(including donations, subsidies, membership fees and religious alms); 
and the productive sector (including banking, lottery, cooperatives and 
businesses).
Trials of the Gift Economy
 e Early Financial Role of Muslim Merchants
In its formative years, the expansion of Muhammadiyah followed 
the trail of textile distribution and manufacturing in urban Java.  e 
organization itself stated quite proudly that  “many members go on 
commercial journeys and bring the Muhammadiyah with them, so that 
they are able to promote it when their task is completed.”7  e case 
of Sumatra is particularly illustrative of this process.  e local reports 
of Muhammadiyah branches frequently mentioned the fact that they 
were founded at the end of the 1920s by merchants (orang-orang 
dagang) from the region of Minangkabau, and, sometimes, from Java.8 
Similarly, the Bondowoso branch in Central Java declared in 1927 that 
its members had “sold artisanal products on a market while preaching, 
particularly to villagers.”
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 e over-representation of merchants, however, was not always 
an advantage for the organization’s expansion. As an example, the 
Muhammadiyah group in the town of Aek Kanopan in North Sumatra 
had seen a drastic drop in its membership during its ë rst year of 
creation in 1933. Its members were often merchants, and many had 
been compelled to resettle in another location more conducive to their 
commercial activities. Interestingly, during these early years the ë gure 
of the merchant-preacher seems to have been assisted in his eff orts 
by other actors of Indonesian society. Founded in 1927, the Medan 
branch in North Sumatra relied on the revenues of a night market 
(pasar malam)9 that was organised with the support of the Sultan, who 
contributed ë nancially through donations and through the provision 
of a plot to host the event.10
Alë an suggested that during the 1920s the contribution of Muslim 
merchants was signië cant in the donations to Muhammadiyah.11 For the 
organization’s Central Board in Yogyakarta, these donations represented 
37  per cent of revenues in 1923 (24,047 of 65,737 guilders).12 For 
the Surakarta (Solo) branch, the ratio was even greater at 60 per cent 
(3,762 guilders). Both towns were at the centre of the textile commerce 
and manufacturing sector, to which the Muhammadiyah was closely 
connected.13 In contrast, 75 per cent (2,953 guilders) of the Batavia 
(Jakarta) branch’s revenues depended on schooling fees. In the case of 
the Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, the overall donations (including 
religious alms, or zakāh) represented 45 per cent of the revenues—to 
which the merchant milieu was potentially one of the most important 
contributors. Clearly, the revenues from the existing businesses 
(8.4  per cent) and member fees (1  per cent) were not suffi  cient for 
the organization’s development or, even, maintenance. Comparatively 
to other towns in which Muhammadiyah was present, the revenues 
of Yogyakarta and Surakarta increased signië cantly between 1923 
and 1932.  is was according to Alë an, another sign of the Muslim 
merchants’ mobilization.
Muhammadiyah Central Board reports include valuable data that 
allow us to better apprehend this potential contribution of the merchant 
class to the organization’s ë nances.  ese documents establish a list of 
donors and the amount of their payments. In 1922, the Central Board 
registered 82 people as donors (59 men and 23 women), including one 
man who had given 1,000 guilders, which was roughly the equivalent 
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of one-third of the total sum of individual donations in Yogyakarta 
(3 425 guilders).14 With the eight persons who had given between 100 
and 200 guilders, this group represented 65 per cent of the donations. 
 ose who had given less than 25 guilders constituted three-quarters of 
the group.  eir contributions amounted to 17 per cent (595 guilders) 
of total individual donations.
In 1923, the registered Surakarta donors totalled 78. Two of them 
had given, respectively, 565 guilders and 592.50 guilders, which 
amounted to 41 per cent of the total donations (2,829 guilders).15 Sixty 
ë ve people, roughly 80 per cent of the group, had given less than 25 
guilders. Seven people had given between 25 and 50 guilders. For the 
remaining eight, the donations were superior to 100 guilders.  us, 
70 per cent of the total sum originated from these eight individuals, 
who represented one-tenth of the group of individual donors. It is 
probable that their annual income was signië cantly higher than the 
average annual income of an urban Javanese (between 348 and 608 
guilders) during these years.16
 is data corroborates the case of Muhammadiyah in Kota Gede, 
as reported by Mitsuo Nakamura.17 One of the two founding members 
of the branch, K.H. Masjudi, was also one of the town’s richest 
merchants and landholders. His father was a textile dealer and regular 
contributor to the Muhammadiyah in Kota Gede. His uncle, Haji 
Muchsin, was similarly an important donor to the branch. He had 
made a fortune from the monopoly on cambric (very ë ne linen used 
in batik manufacturing) imported from Japan, which had been granted 
to him by the Dutch authorities for the whole region of Yogyakarta. 
His third wedding to K.H. Ahmad Dahlan’s niece further helped to 
incorporate him institutionally to Muhammadiyah. Haji Muchsin 
joined the Central Board in the early 1920s, where he was put in charge 
of religious endowments (wakāf). He became one of the biggest donors 
to the organization, contributing nearly 500 guilders per year.
While the aforementioned data from 1922 and 1923 shows that 
contributions from wealthy individuals were dominant, it should be 
noted that the category of resource in which their donations fell—called 
‘donatie’, or nominally registered donations—represented only part 
of the total from donations, to which individuals with more modest 
revenues could have contributed.
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and 100,000 guilders per year, the governmental subsidies accounted 
for around half of the total income of the organization in Yogyakarta.22 
Quite logically, the humanitarian and education departments were the 
direct beneë ciaries of this type of resource within Muhammadiyah.23 As 
an example, in 1936 governmental subsidies represented, respectively, 
70 per cent (12,916 guilders) and 40 per cent (50,377 guilders) of their 
income.24
If one should take into account the total income of Muhammadiyah 
on the national level, including the revenues of regional representations 
and branches, the ratio of subsidies was most certainly much more 
modest. It was, as estimated by Alë an, to be 15 per cent in 1932.25 
At the organization’s headquarters in Yogyakarta, however, the specië c 
proportion, hovering around 50 per cent, may have appeared as a 
troubling development. In fact, this dependency on colonial funding 
provoked heated debates in Muhammadiyah circles. In 1935, a 
controversy ensued on the origins and use of funds by the Central 
Board. In an attempt to resolve this issue, the Central Board put in place 
a commission to verify its accounts and invited an external auditor.26 
Yet, the most effi  cient argument in defence of subsidies seemed to 
be of an ideological nature. In 1939, an important ë gure of Islamic 
modernism, Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah—who was also known 
as HAMKA and was a member of the Central Board—answered critics 
in the following way:
 e Muhammadiyah is convinced that it is necessary to request subsidies, 
at a time when millions and millions of Indonesia’s riches are being used by 
the Netherlands for the development of the Christian faith, while 90 per 
cent of the population is Muslim. With each passing year, the Dutch 
support to Christians increases and this is a reaction to the development of 
charitable works [‘amal] by Muhammadiyah.27
Similarly, one of the organization’s branches in Sumatra criticized 
the fact that “Islam cannot expand [in Batak lands]28 because of the 
Christian religion, the lack of workforce, [the lack of funding] and the 
absence of subsidies in the way the Christians beneë t from.”29
 ese critiques were not baseless. With the Ethical Policy’s 
implementation at the beginning of the 20th century, the colonial 
authorities had put in place an educational reform that was meant to 
contribute to indigenous development.  rough this new program, 
Christian schools, as the most numerous Dutch schools already active 
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in the archipelago, became the largest beneë ciaries of governmental 
subsidies. In 1937-38, of the 216 Muhammadiyah ‘people’s school’ 
(volkscholen), 99 received governmental funding. In the same period, 
1,727 Protestant schools, 537 Catholic schools and 95 secular schools 
were beneë ting from this scheme.30 In 1936, the governmental budget 
for non-religious educational activities attributed 686,000 guilders 
to Protestants, 285,000 guilders to Catholics and 7,500 guilders to 
Muslims. In 1939, the funds increased signië cantly for Protestants 
(844,000 guilders) and Catholics (355,700 guilders), whereas they 
stagnated for Muslims (7,600 guilders).31
Realizing this disparity, the Muhammadiyah—as well as its 
traditionalist rival, the Nahdlatul Ulama—called in 1937 for an end 
to all governmental subsidizing, whether it concerned Christians or 
Muslims institutions.32  is demand was not acknowledged, however.
Membership Fees, Public donations and Religious Alms
Other forms of resources were available to the Muhammadiyah.  e 
1935 statutes established that monthly membership contributions were 
set to 10 cents for individuals, 7.5 guilders for branches (cabang) and 
2.5 guilders for groups (grup, i.e. sub-units, later known as ranting). 
 e payment was considered compulsory, and the failure to abide 
could result in being excluded from the Muhammadiyah—at least in 
theory. In 1923, these contributions represented less than 1 per cent 
(625 guilders) of the organization’s income.33 For the 1930s and the 
early 1940s, comparison to the previous decade is rather tricky since 
the data can be separated in two sets: the organization’s revenues in 
Yogyakarta (all departments included); and the Central Board in itself. 
 is distinction was not apparent during the 1920s.34 
For the second half of the 1930s and the early 1940s, in the case 
of Yogyakarta (all departments included) member contributions stayed 
below the 1  per cent threshold. Clearly, the women’s association, 
the Aisyiyah, was the institution that could count most on these 
membership contributions. For example, these represented 38  per 
cent of the organization’s revenues in 1941. For the Central Board 
itself, the ratio could reach as high as 18 per cent (1936) but fall to 
as low as 3  per cent (1941). It should be noted that, in the second 
half of the 1930s, an important part of the Central Board’s revenues—
between 25 per cent and 40 per cent—came from the Madjelis Sjoera, 
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a gathering of departments and sections ë nanced, in principle, by a 
monthly contribution from branches (1.5 guilders each) and groups 
(0.5 guilders each) of the Muhammadiyah.35
In the ë rst half of the 1950s, the Central Board (excluding 
departments and sections) in Yogyakarta relied heavily on membership 
contributions (uang pangkal).  is resource amounted to 46.4 per cent 
in 1953 and 49.1 per cent in 1954, with a 60 per cent increase between 
these two years.36 However, in the second half of the 1950s, there was 
signië cant decline of this resource and its share in the overall revenues 
of the Central Board (see tables). From September 1962 to May 1965, 
membership contributions amounted to 5  per cent of the Central 
Board’s total revenues.
 e category of ‘donations’ was one of the most important resources 
for the organization in Yogyakarta. During his commercial ventures 
throughout Java, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan himself was keen on preaching 
reformist principles while gathering funds for his organization. It 
has been reported that during one of these trips in West Java, he had 
managed to collect a total of 3,500 guilders,37 which was equivalent to 
10 times the average annual income of an Indonesian in small towns 
in 1925.38 According to the Muhammadiyah statutes, any institution, 
enterprise and person—without any distinction of race or religion—
could donate to the organization. To further mobilize this type income, 
members did not hesitate to directly solicit the population. For instance, 
in 1923, as the period of economic malaise struck the Dutch Indies, the 
Batavia branch set up a donations committee (Comite Pendjari Derma), 
which managed to receive 500 guilders during a ë ve-month period.39 
For the year 1923, donations amounted to 23,962 guilders, i.e. 
37 per cent of the total revenues of the Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta.40 
In Solo, the ratio was 60 per cent; in Batavia it was 4 per cent.41 In 1929, 
for Yogyakarta, the amount of donations was close to 1923 (26,746 
guilders). In real value, it had increased by 41 per cent. Compared to 
total income, the ratio fell to 16.3 per cent as the amount of subsidies 
greatly increased (see above). For the organization, data for the 1930s 
and early 1940s conë rm the decreasing ratio of donations compared 
to the overall importance of subsidies that was observed in 1929. For 
the Central Board itself, the share of donations in total revenues was 
much more signië cant (see tables).  is was also the case in the second 
half of the 1950s and the ë rst half of the 1960s. From September 1962 
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to May 1965, the mixed category of donations/contributions (derma/
sokongan)42 represented 57 per cent of the Central Board’s total revenues.
Religious alms (zakāh) constituted another signië cant source of 
income for the organization in Yogyakarta. At the end of the 1920s, 
Muhammadiyah set itself the objective of reforming zakat í trah—
donations in cash or in kind (most often rice) at the end of the holy 
month of Ramadan. Zakāh collection was operated by local religious 
authorities who, as ‘alms administrators’ (‘āmil), legally appropriated a 
certain amount of these donations.43  e practice also allowed direct 
donations to individuals considered in need because of their social or 
economic conditions. From 1926 onwards, Muhammadiyah began 
to take charge directly of the collection and distribution of zakat 
í trah.44 In 1927, the 16th general assembly had clearly established that 
the organization should “become an institution [that has the task] of 
collecting and distributing zakāh.”45 Muhammadiyah, thus, condemned 
in religious terms the transiting of funds through local traditional 
actors, mentioned previously, and the lack of a clear deë nition in the 
process of donating. As Mitsuo Nakamura noted, these reforms in zakat 
í trah “presented a direct challenge to the authority and the material 
foundation of traditional religious offi  cials.”46
 e zakāh category represented 22 per cent (7,626 guilders) of the 
total revenues in Yogyakarta in 1922, 7.8 per cent (5,034 guilders) 
in 1923 and 2.4 per cent (3,891 guilders) in 1929. In real value, the 
resource had decreased by 42 per cent between 1922 and 1929. In 
the 1930s, the ratio for the total revenues (all departments included) 
hovered at around 1 per cent. For the Central Board itself, it varied 
between 2 per cent and 7 per cent. For the case of the Proselytization 
Department, which was the main beneë ciary of this resource, it could 
attain 71 per cent in 1941, for example. During the 1950s, however, 
zakāh revenues increased progressively for the Central Board, going 
from 4 per cent (Rp 4,065) of its income in 1953 to 25 per cent in 
1958 (Rp 56,713).  us, it had multiplied by ë ve in real value. From 
September 1962 to May 1965,47 zakāh amounted to Rp 3 million (15.5 
per cent of total revenues).48
Globally then, the ë gures show that Muhammadiyah relied 
strongly—and quite logically so—on the ‘gift economy’, whether 
religious or not. More interestingly, during the pre-War period, 
colonial subsidies had taken a greater importance in the organization’s 
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ë nances. Conscious of the fact that its resources were all too dependent 
on external agents, whether that be the wider population or the 
government, Muhammadiyah’s leadership sought to develop alternative 
sources of funding in the productive sector.
Muhammadiyah and the Market Economy
A Renewed Economic Awareness
While the defence of indigenous enterprise was one of Sarekat Islam’s 
main objectives from an early stage,49 there was also an acknowledgement 
of the economy’s importance within Ahmad Dahlan’s organization.  e 
context was one of growing nationalism against colonial rule, but also 
of increasing tensions between indigenous and Chinese entrepreneurs. 
Within Muhammadiyah, the 16th general assembly (1927) in 
Pekalongan proposed to set up “economic instruction in schools, dakwah 
(proselytization) sessions and its institutions.”50 But it was during the 
next decade that its economic orientation became even more evident. 
 is was, possibly, a reaction to the eff ects of the 1929 global economic 
crisis. In 1935, Muhammadiyah’s 24th general assembly decided to 
create a specië c group in charge of economic matters. With the goal of 
“improving the economic condition of the Muhammadiyah community 
and overcome the state of poverty”, which presented “an obstacle to 
the implementation of God’s will”, the organization announced the 
formation of a Directive Council for the Economy (Madjlis Pimpinan 
Ke-economiean).  is institution was to be based in Batavia (Jakarta) and 
integrated into the main structure of the organization.51 Its objective was 
to “guide/direct the economic functioning of Muhammadiyah members 
in general.” But the general assembly also specië ed the rule that any 
economic initiative had to be taken outside of the organization itself, 
probably in order to preserve its non-lucrative foundations, and, even 
more so, to safeguard it from potential ë nancial failures.
 e two following general assemblies, in Batavia (1936) and Yogyakarta 
(1937), conë rmed the economic orientation proposed in 1935.  ey 
initiated what was to be called the Economic Aff airs Department (Badan 
Toentoenan Per-economiän).52 One of this body’s ë rst and most important 
initiatives was to give a favourable ‘pre-advice’ (preaedvies) to the creation 
of a bank by the Muhammadiyah— a project that had been called for 
insistently by some ë gures and representations within the organization.53 
Illustrative of this new economic awareness, Kartosoedarmo, the 
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Central Board representative (consul) for the West-Java region, declared 
in 1939 that:
As we are facing economic problems, we, the Indonesian Muslim 
community, are in great diffi  culty; [indeed] studies have showed that the 
spirit of Islamic motivation is still inì uenced by questions of jurisprudence 
(í qh)54 that proliferate in our midst today.55
Kartosoedarmo observed that while Indonesia was rich in natural 
resources, it was limited to function as a market for European, 
American and Chinese products, or, again, as a source of cheap labour 
for outside investors.56 One of the solutions for indigenous enterprise, 
and particularly for Muhammadiyah, was, therefore, to have access to 
capital through, logically, a banking institution.
As it incorporated many merchants in its ranks, the Minangkabau 
branch (West Sumatra) also wanted to make its voice heard on this 
particular matter. It “had enough of the fact that Indonesians did not 
practice the economy, but were subjected to the economy of others.”57 
As an indication of this state of aff airs, the branch regretted the fact 
that a growing number of leaders and members were renouncing their 
responsibilities within Muhammadiyah because they did not have 
suffi  cient ë nancial resources. Minangkabau also noted the fact that 
the organization was spending large amounts of funds for its daily 
functioning while having, at the same time, vast potentialities of capital 
through the mass of its members. Hence, it called for the creation of a 
“productive institution [to manage this] wealth.” 
As an example, the branch suggested the following plan: if the 5,000 
active members of the 250 branches and groups of the Minangkabau 
region each acquired a share (andeel) of 5 guilders only, then the 
organization could already have access to 25,000 guilders.  erefore, 
for the whole of Indonesia, the potential starting capital of such an 
institution was deemed immense. Minangkabau also suggested creating 
local branches, to which 2,000 guilders each would be attributed.  e 
institution was to be a legal entity managed by specialists of the economy, 
law and religion. Its main purpose would be to help in the creation of 
businesses to respond to the demands of the local economy and allow 
Muhammadiyah members’ consumption to stay within the community.
As the host of Muhammadiyah’s Economic Aff airs Department 
(EAD), the Batavia branch also had a clear opinion on the matter. 
It ë rst insisted on developing an ‘industrial sector’— an initiative 
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that had to be considered as a ‘religious precept’. In its journal 
Pantjaran ‘Amal, the branch announced that it was setting up a 
program linked to this sector within the Muhammadiyah institutions 
of higher learning, and encouraged readers to participate with their 
donations.58 More importantly, and to better comprehend the EAD’s 
strategy of the following decades, Batavia gave its own diagnosis of 
the indigenous enterprise’s weaknesses.59 According to the branch, 
there was little unity and coordination, a clear deë cit in the education 
of members on economic, ë nancial and technical matters, a lack of 
information and organization within Muhammadiyah, and ë nally a 
shortage of capital and credit.60 Moreover, one of the main failings 
of indigenous businesses was the fact that they had not been able to 
develop the organizational capacity that made for the success of the 
‘Western model’ and other ‘developed nations’.61 Clearly validating 
the ‘excessive individualism’62 thesis of indigenous enterprises, the 
Batavia branch also declared:
We all realize that many of our businesses, from small to big, are based on 
only one individual. If it happens that [this person] becomes sick or passes 
away, then very rapidly his business weakens or disappears as well.
 e Muhammadiyah thus appeared to be the ideal structure to 
institutionalize and further develop indigenous capital. For this, one 
of the ë rst initiatives taken by the Economic Aff airs Department had 
been to try to collect data on the economic activities of the members. 
Batavia called for all branches (tjabang) and groups (grup) to provide 
information on their activities in detail.  e detail required included: 
whether they were in the agricultural sector, farming, manufacture, 
forestry; the nature of the imported/exported products; modes of 
transportation of these merchandises; market prices; needs and customs 
of local populations.63
It was, however, over a decade later that the modernist organization 
really started to invest in businesses on a large scale.  ere are probably 
many reasons why it preferred not to do so at an early stage of its 
development, at least not too openly. One of them is possibly the 
fact that, at the beginning of the 1920s, the modernist organization 
had encountered acute criticism from the communist current within 
the Sarekat Islam (SI). As the Muhammadiyah refused to take part in 
the political struggle opposing the colonial rule, the ‘Red-SI’ accused 
Ahmad Dahlan’s organization of being motivated by mere materialistic 
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aims.  is was an argument that had already been used quite effi  ciently 
by the communists against Tjokroaminoto, the leader of SI.64 As 
shown by Takashi Shiraishi, the communists, through the periodical 
Islam bergerak, blamed Muhammadiyah for being dominated by the 
colonizers/exploiters, a submissive posture that was explained by the 
fact that the organization represented ‘capitalist Islam’.  is was an 
‘Islam of the wealthy’, on the contrary to the SI, which symbolized an 
‘Islam of solidarity and equality’ (Islam sama rasa sama rata) or, again, 
‘communist Islam’ (Islam komunis).65
In this context, Muhammadiyah ë rst developed cooperatives—a 
type of institution that seemed to minimize the ethical tensions 
between collectivist principles and economic rationalization.66  e 
cooperative movement appeared in the circles of batik entrepreneurs 
in Yogyakarta and Solo in 1934-1935.67 Muhammadiyah had 
already decided in 1931, during its twentieth general assembly in 
Yogyakarta, that its cooperatives had to be created outside of the 
organizational structure. Once again, this was probably decided to 
shelter the organization from eventual failures.68 While the 1920s 
and 1930s data on the Central Board’s ë nances and the organization’s 
multiple departments in Yogyakarta do not show a clear input from 
cooperatives, the contribution of such institutions to the local ë nances 
of the Muhammadiyah branches should not be underestimated. James 
Peacock noted that in Pekajangan, the branch’s cooperative ë nanced 
the building of high-quality infrastructure just two years after it had 
been created (1934).69
Early Debates on Interest Banking
During the 1930s, Muhammadiyah also showed a willingness to 
establish a banking institution of its own. As was the case with other 
countries in the Islamic world, the question of interest banking was 
a controversial one in the Dutch Indies. In the early 20th century, 
Islamic organizations diff ered greatly in their interpretations of the 
problem. In 1925, the Jong Islamieten Bond (Union of Islamic 
Youths) declared that banking institutions used by the Dutch and 
the Chinese were prohibited for Muslims. It called for the issuance of 
a fatwá (legal advice) on the matter.70 Created in 1927 by the Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) to produce fatwás for its members, 
but ideally also for all Indonesian Muslims, the Madjlis Ulama 
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(Council of Ulamas)71 decided that interest banking was similar to 
usury and was, therefore, prohibited. Tjokroaminoto was later given 
the responsibility of creating an interest-free bank, but the project 
never materialized.72 Although Persatuan Islam (Persis) was known 
for its scripturalist interpretation of Islam, it considered that interest 
banking was authorized because it implied reasonable rates rather 
than usury, as deë ned in the Qur’an.73
Muhammadiyah adopted a rather equivocal position on the matter. 
In its 1927 report, it condemned usury in the harshest terms:
As we realize the malevolence of ‘usury eaters’ and rentiers, [we are going 
to establish] associations to replace usury and to oppose excessive proë t, 
as well as cooperatives and other institutions. In truth, usury has always 
been forbidden by Islam and the person who uses it is disapproved.  us, 
this God-given prohibition has to be avoided and not be approached, even 
once, neither closely nor from afar.74
However, in the 1930s, the organization also debated the necessity 
of creating a banking institution.  e eff ects of the 1929 crisis and, 
more generally, the chronic diffi  culties of small entrepreneurs in having 
access to capital, were, perhaps again, driving reasons why the matter 
was considered as essential. It was, thus, debated from 1935 to 1937 
during the 24th, 25th and 26th general assemblies. Following these, it was 
decided that “one of the instruments to contribute to the improvement 
of Muslims’ economic condition” was a Muhammadiyah Bank.75  e 
general assembly had followed the ‘pre-advice’ from the Economic 
Aff airs Department based within the Batavia branch, which was, at 
that time, the greatest supporter of the creation of a bank in order to 
improve the organization’s economic development.
 e department had been given the task of developing the project 
leading up to the following year’s general assembly. To justify the use 
of interest banking, as opposed to the abusive dimension of usury, the 
department suggested that the practice could be considered as licit if 
it implied taking “a modest surplus on the payment [of a loan]”.  is 
excess was justië ed by the existence of ‘administrative fees’ (ongkos 
administratie) for the bank. Batavia had also proposed other solutions 
to the problem, such as proë t and loss sharing or, again, a form of 
‘murabaha’ scheme. With this latter technique, also known today as 
‘mark-up ë nancing’, the client requests the bank to purchase a certain 
item that is then sold to him for a deë nite and theoretically reasonable 
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proë t over the cost, as settled in advance.76  e case of Muhammadiyah 
clearly shows that Indonesian Islam was, quite early on, well-informed 
of the ethical debates surrounding the idea of ‘Islamic economics’.
 e 1937 general assembly had also given the task of debating 
the ethical aspects of the matter to the Council for Legal-Religious 
Aff airs (Majelis Tarjih).77 However, the council had adopted a rather 
conservative position in giving its support to the creation of a bank. 
It established as a condition that the ‘modest surplus’ argument 
advanced by the Economic Aff airs Department in Batavia be removed 
altogether.78 It also reaffi  rmed that all interest-bearing techniques that 
had been ë xed in advance (ribā’ nasī’ah), as well as all products or 
money exchanges implying a surplus (ribā’ faḍīl), were to be considered 
as prohibited.
 e declarations of K.H. Mas Mansoer, who was head of the 
Majelis Tarjih since its creation in 1927/1928 and was later leader 
of Muhammadiyah (1937-1944), reì ected this uneasy positioning 
within the organization. He acknowledged the importance of banking 
institutions for the world’s economic development and, thus, the 
necessity for Muslims to adopt them even though they were prohibited. 
 us, interest banking was to be considered as “prohibited [ḥarām] 
but tolerated, [although] facilitated and excused because the current 
situation [required] it.”79 However, the Muhammadiyah banking 
project did not materialize in these early years.
In the 1960s, the matter was debated once again. In 1965, the 36th 
general assembly in Bandung (20-25 July) called for Muhammadiyah, 
or its Economic Aff airs Department (EAD, called ‘Majelis Ekonomi’ 
since the 1950s) to “arrange for the creation of a bank as an eff ort 
for the development and the organization of capital and forces for 
members of the Muhammadiyah.”80 In 1968, during a meeting in 
the town of Sidoarjo, the Council for Legal-Religious Aff airs (Majelis 
Tarjih) reaffi  rmed the ruling that interest was to be considered as 
prohibited (ḥarām). But it also acknowledged that it was diffi  cult for 
Muslims to isolate themselves from the world’s economic system, of 
which interest banking was considered as an essential mechanism. 
Moreover, the council considered the case of interest banking in 
governmental institutions to be ‘undetermined’ (mutashābbihāt), and 
would, therefore, implicitly tolerate its practice.  e council’s decision 
was based on four main arguments: 1) proë ts from governmental 
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banks beneë ted the whole of society because these institutions were 
state property (an argument that had formerly been used by reformists 
Mohammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida);81 2) interest rates were 
considered reasonable and thus could not be conì ated with usury; 3) 
the current banking system had enough regulations to limit abuse ; 4) 
Muslims could not migrate to a ‘true’ Islamic banking system as it was 
still non-existent at that time.82 
At a moment when Indonesia was still reeling from the economic 
diffi  culties of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, and while the New Order 
of Suharto was starting to expand its developmentalist ideology, it was 
perhaps important for Muhammadiyah to be seen as not hindering the 
country’s economic growth for religious-legalistic reasons.83 It should 
be noted that this matter was far from being limited to the national 
level or to being a mere debate between judicial religious experts. At 
the base of the organization, some Muhammadiyah branches eagerly 
awaited the green light from the Central Board in order to deposit their 
various incomes and obtain an interest out of these funds.84
 e Lottery Issue
In the 1930s, interest banking was not the only sector in which 
tensions existed between religious ethics and economic rationalization. 
Financial reports of the period show that a non-negligible part of the 
Humanitarian Department’s income came from the lottery, a practice 
usually considered as prohibited by Islamic doctrine. While the lottery 
represented 15 per cent of the department’s total revenues in 1938, the 
ratio decreased to 5-6 per cent in 1939-40, and was nil in 1941.
As early as 1927, some Muhammadiyah members had voiced their 
opposition to this practice. To those with ‘impatient hearts’ (kurang 
sabar hatinja) who criticized the use of the lottery, the Central Board 
answered that these internal dissensions endangered the movement and 
that:
 e Muhammadiyah requires charity from everyone, [a rule] that has 
been given by God, even as those to whom it demands are cheaters, ‘usury 
eaters’, crooks and people who take for themselves proscribed products. 
 ose who transgress God’s proscriptions will surely have to suff er His 
torments and the Muhammadiyah members who do not take part in these 
sins will undoubtedly be safe.85
Moreover, during the 22th general assembly in 1933 the organization 
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once again used the argument of ‘non-determination’ (mutashābbihāt) 
to justify the existence of this ë nancing instrument.  e council of 
legal-religious aff airs concluded that lottery could be classië ed in three 
actions: 1) buying tickets for it; 2) getting a proë t from it; 3) organizing 
the lottery in itself. For the act of buying tickets, the council determined 
that the negative aspects were more important than the positives one, 
and thus declared it prohibited (ḥarām).  e legal character of ‘getting 
a proë t’ from the lottery and ‘organising the lottery’ was left to the local 
branches to be decided.86 Once again, the jurisprudential ambiguity 
allowed the practice to be pursued. By the 1950s, the lottery was no 
longer seen in any way as appropriate by the organization. Among 
other vices, gambling was targeted in campaigns both on the popular 
and legislative levels.
 e Growth and Decline of Muhammadiyah Businesses
During the 1920s and 1930s, the creation of businesses per se 
by the organization itself seemed relatively limited.  ose that were 
established had mainly the purpose of answering the internal demands 
of the members, sympathizers and the multiple departments and 
branches.  is was an idea that was going to be further developed 
during the following decades. In 1927-1928, a printing company 
(Uitgever Maatschappij) was established in Yogyakarta. Its goal was to 
produce books, manuals and other materials under the supervision of 
the Central Board’s Department of Documentation (Taman Poestaka). 
As the initiative apparently worried the branches and groups, which 
saw the enterprise as a competitor in the local demand for books, the 
Central Board suggested that the market was large enough, especially 
within the numerous Muhammadiyah schools. 
 e starting capital of the printing company had been raised 
through a formal appeal. Each branch had to—theoretically—buy a 
share (andeel) worth 25 guilders, while groups were simply invited to 
do so.87 With this funding, the capital was supposed to attain at least 
5,000 guilders. In the following years, the organization apparently used 
this kind of appeal a number of times to consolidate the ë nances of the 
company.
In 1923, businesses contributed slightly more than 8 per cent (5,423 
guilders) of Muhammadiyah income in Yogyakarta.88 In 1929, this type of 
revenue had fallen to 2,735 guilders, representing 1.7 per cent of the total 
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income. In the second half of the 1930s, the contribution of businesses 
generally stayed below the threshold of 1 per cent of total revenues for 
Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta (all departments included).  e main 
departments concerned by this income were those of Humanitarian 
Aff airs (PKO, Penolong Kesengsaran Oemoem), Documentation (Taman 
Poestaka) and the women’s organization Aisyiyah. For the Central Board 
itself, the contribution of enterprises reached 2.1 per cent (133 guilders) 
in 1934 and 4.8 per cent (128 guilders) in 1935. From 1936 to 1941, 
however this total was nil (see annex tables).89
In 1948, the organization had created in Yogyakarta a trading 
ë rm called Faida.90 It was supposed to pursue the activities of another 
enterprise called Makloem, which had been created by members of the 
Muhammadiyah for the purpose of selling mainly common goods (tea, 
salt, noodle, etc.) to members and teachers of the organization for a 
reasonable price.91 
During the 1950s, while the country was enjoying its newfound 
freedom and liberal democracy—which seemed to off er more 
opportunities for Muslim elites—the situation changed considerably 
in the ë nances of Muhammadiyah. During the 31st general assembly 
in 1950, some branches called for the arrangement of a special meeting 
on the economy and for the reactivation (digiatkan) of the Central 
Board’s Economic Aff airs Department (EAD).92  is was done in 1951 
during Muhammadiyah’s annual conference (Sidang Tanwir), when the 
EAD was the subject of a re-founding as its objectives were deë ned 
as “implementing the advancement of the great Muhammadiyah 
family in the domain of economics, establishing reports and collecting 
information.”93
Once again, eff orts were made in gathering data on the economic 
activities of the members to promote a more effi  cient coordination of 
ë nancial means.94 Yet, the EAD’s objectives were more ambitious than 
before. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Central Board intended to 
create a branch of the EAD at the local level within each representations 
of Muhammadiyah. Moreover, every branch had the right to request 
the guidance of an EAD representative to receive recommendations 
on the creation and management of businesses. It was hoped that the 
entrepreneurs within Muhammadiyah could, in this way, respond to 
the demands of the local market at a time when the government was 
implementing a policy of import substitution industrialization.95 
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 e EAD called on the Indonesian people to “change its status from 
one of a user and buyer, to the one of user, buyer and producer.”96 
It mentioned particularly certain key sectors in the agricultural ë eld 
(clove, pepper, resin, gambier, cinnamon and rattan, among others). 
Ideally, each branch of the EAD was to function as a centre of trading 
and distribution for the products of Muhammadiyah members. It was 
to be a mechanism of rationalization that had to move upwards to 
the Central Board’s EAD in Jakarta.  e EAD also declared that it 
was ready to go through the banking and administrative red tape to 
facilitate the creation of businesses by the branches and members.
From 1953 to 1958, the category of ‘productive revenues’ (hasil) 
of the Central Board had tripled97 from Rp. 26,811 (26.1 percent of 
total revenues) to Rp. 82,095 (35.9 per cent of total revenues).98 In real 
value, however, this amounted to a more modest but still signië cant 
increase of 18 per cent. While the data currently available does not allow 
precise deë nition of the real contribution of businesses in this category 
(which could include land and car rental services, for example), the 
reports of the EAD clearly show that during this decade the economic 
engagement of the Muhammadiyah was extensive.
In 1954, the EAD suggested that economic institutions should be of 
two types: a cooperative or a ‘limited liability company’ (N.V., Naamloze 
Vennootschap), also known as Perseroan Terbatas (P.T.).99 Members were 
also reminded that a capital of Rp. 250,000 was required to have the 
status of an importer at a national level. Preferably, those who intended 
to acquire shares in the businesses and cooperatives were to be registered 
members of Muhammadiyah.  e EC suggested that the recruitment of 
the workforce be operated within the organization and, also, that only 
people who could commit to full-time employment be considered in 
order to promote professionalism.  e numerous teachers and white-
collar workers within the organization were, therefore, theoretically 
excluded from the process.  e Central Board and the local branches 
that created the businesses had the right to receive 10 per cent of their 
proë ts.100
During these years, Muhammadiyah businesses operated mainly 
in the two sectors of publishing and textile manufacturing.  rough 
an appeal to branches and groups, the EAD founded the Publishing 
Association of Muhammadiyah (Jajasan Penerbitan Muhammadijah), 
which continued the activities of a former company, N.V. Penerbitan 
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Tintamas, created in 1951.101 In 1953, the EC created a shirt 
manufacturer in the town of Bandung (West Java) and announced 
that it was planning to form other manufacturers in Solo and 
Semarang (Central Java) to produce textiles, shoes and bicycle tires.102 
In 1954, another publishing company was created. N.V. Tamaddun 
had a substantial starting capital of 1.5 million rupiah, thanks to the 
contributions of Central Board member K.H. Fakih Oesman and, more 
interestingly, former Prime Minister and leader of the Islamic Masyumi 
Party, Moehammad Natsir.103 Other ë gures, including members of 
parliament and various businessmen, also participated in the eff ort.  e 
company’s main activities were the publishing and trading of books on 
Islam and in Arabic, along with offi  ce supplies.104  e company was 
still active at least until the ë rst-half of the 1960s.
In another sector, the EAD announced in 1957 that, for the ë rst 
time in its history, Muhammadiyah had created a modern factory for 
clothing in the town of Pekajangan in Central Java.  e eff ort, in terms 
of investment for the machines, was sizeable, totaling Rp. 360,000.105 
 is sum almost amounted to the Central Board’s total revenues in 
1957. Comparatively, a big batik manufacturing business in 1956, with 
55 full-time employees and 95 half-time employees, required some 
Rp. 500,000 in ë xed and working capital.106 While the origin of the 
funding was not mentioned in the reports, a political source would be 
a possibility, given the case in 1954. Indeed, the Central Board received 
Rp. 27,714 in 1956.  is followed the 1955 general elections in which 
Masyumi—supported widely by Muhammadiyah members—had 
taken part. In 1957, party leader Natsir donated Rp. 70,000  to the 
Central Board. Additionally, in 1956/57, a similar sum was given by 
the Federation of Cooperatives of Batik Producers (GKBI), to which 
the Muhammadiyah had been historically connected.
 e declared goal of the Pekajangan factory was to create products 
of better quality than the usual standard, but also less costly. Regional 
and local representations of Muhammadiyah were urged to order 
products through the EAD, with the promise of bulk-rate reductions. 
Other manufacturers, such as one in Bandung, had been the object of a 
similar modernization process, with the purchasing of new machines in 
1954. For the town of Solo, the EAD announced that it had put aside 
Rp. 500,000 to acquire a new plot of land and create a textile and shoe 
factory. In Yogyakarta, the EC also put in place the INTEX cooperative 
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(Industri Textil), which used new machines as well.  e starting capital 
of Rp. 380,000 had originated from the 38 members of the cooperative. 
 e EC had also spent Rp. 360,000 for the creation of an automated 
textile factory and Rp. 225,000 for a towel factory. In its endeavours, 
the EAD declared that it had the support of the Ministry of Industry 
(Djawatan Perindustrian), the Ministry of Commerce (Perdagangan 
Dalam Negeri) and the Yogyakarta Cooperative.
In the same year of 1954, Muhammadiyah created the Indonesian 
Union of Islamic Merchants (PERDAMI, Persatuan Dagang Muslimin 
Indonesia), based in Kota Gede near Yogyakarta. Its objectives were 
to operate in various sectors, such as agriculture, industry, commerce 
and publishing. Because many of its members had already gone on the 
pilgrimage to Mecca and were considered to have a certain experience 
in maritime transport, it was decided that the PERDAMI should invest 
in this particular sector. In January 1954, Rp. 250,000 had already been 
collected for the projected Rp. 1 million of the union’s starting capital.107
Following a lease of Rp. 3 million contracted at the Indonesian 
Banking Corporation (IBC) and facilitated by the Finance Ministry 
in 1957, Muhammadiyah acquired two Central Java publishing 
businesses along with their land: Pertjetakan Seraju in Purwokerto and 
Pertjetakan Putera in Gombong. Muhammadiyah spent Rp 1.5 million 
for the acquisitions and Rp. 500,000 for the working capital.  e rest 
was transferred back to the IBC.108 It appears that  Muhammadiyah’s 
Central Board experienced some diffi  culties in reimbursing the sum 
and had to use funds originally intended for the building of a hospital 
in Jakarta.109
It is not clear whether the EAD’s initiatives in various sectors were 
later on discontinued because of mismanagement or, more generally, 
because of the degradation of the national economy during ‘Guided 
Democracy’. Starting in 1959, this period was marked by President 
Soekarno’s show of hostility towards foreign investments in the 
country and, more generally, towards the market economy.  e 1962-
1965 ë nancial reports of the Central Board clearly indicate that the 
contribution of businesses was negligible at 0.38  per cent of total 
revenues, equal to Rp. 72,925. Evidently, the publishing activities—
such as the Suara Muhammadiyah periodical and book retailing—were 
the most important source of revenue in the category of ‘productive’ 
activities (13.6 per cent).110
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Although reports from the 1960s indicate that the creation 
of businesses was much less considerable than in the 1950s, the 
organization continued to call for the improvement of the economic 
condition of its members and sympathizers.  is, it was believed, would 
allow for better cooperation between members, for the organization of 
meetings on the economic theme and, also, the ‘reactivation’ of the 
EAD.111 Muhammadiyah’s programs for the periods of 1966-1968 and 
1968-1972 show that the organization’s actions were mainly aimed 
at identifying its members’ activities and potentials, and developing 
EAD’s branches at each level of the structural representations.112 
Muhammadiyah would have to wait until the end of the 1990s to 
witness, once more, the economic drive that marked the 1950s.
Concluding Remarks
 e fact that the modernist organization’s economic initiatives have 
not materialized into durable entrepreneurial institutions, as has been 
hoped for throughout the decades, is quite intriguing. Macro-economic 
factors, competition from other businesses, and internal management 
issues could have well been at the source of these diffi  culties. However, 
the archives and the more recent Muhammadiyah initiatives in the 
early 2000s in the business sphere have pointed to another important 
challenge:113 it is not an easy task for an organization based on charitable 
foundations to operate an economic transformation where the idea 
of ‘proë t’ is central.114 In this process, it seems that the organization 
could barely escape from what had been described by Max Weber in 
the early 20th century—that is the existence of “a struggle in principle 
between ethical rationalization and the process of rationalization in the 
economic ë eld.”115  e case of Muhammadiyah shows that although 
Islam has historically a strong commercial orientation, it can—like 
other religious traditions—be confronted with inherent tensions 
produced from the overlapping of the religious and economic ë elds.
 is, evidently, has not prevented Muhammadiyah from being 
a major actor of Indonesia’s religious and social transformations. 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, it has been answering the 
spiritual and material needs of millions of Indonesians through its 
schools, universities, hospitals and orphanages.  e archives show 
that the modernist organization, throughout its history, did not lack 
an economic drive, either. At a time when Indonesia is witnessing a 
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sustained growth, a burgeoning middle-class and an ever-strengthening 
religious resurgence, the problem of entrepreneurship is now more 
than ever an issue of major importance and a matter of debate in 
Muhammadiyah circles.
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